It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs ( i.e. , an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers for his dogmatism (...) – to avoid scepticism of perceptual justification and to explicate perceptual justification – fail due to his commitment with some externalist theses, which make it impossible to satisfy the metaepistemic requisites imposed by the sceptic. Hence given the lack of satisfaction of Pryor's own goals, we conclude that Pryor's dogmatism is not an adequate explication of perceptual justification. (shrink)